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FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 
THROUGH CRIMINAL PROSECUTION* 
STEVEN PURO** 
ABSTRACT 
Federal criminal prosecution of law enforcement officers’ violations of 
individuals’ civil rights is a traditional way to remedy law enforcement 
misconduct.  The U.S. Department of Justice has significant interactions with 
state and local officials in these processes.  There was increased emphasis on 
U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section law 
enforcement criminal prosecutions in the last five years of the period from 
fiscal year 1985 to fiscal year 2001.  Patterns of Criminal Section behavior are 
observed during this seventeen-year period and the most recent five years.  
This article demonstrates structural and legal problems faced by federal 
prosecutors bringing suit against law enforcement officials under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
241 and 242. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Intergovernmental relations between the United States and state 
governments concerning police accountability are central to enacting effective 
societal control over police conduct. These relationships reflect dynamic 
interactions between the federal and state governments.  Control of police has 
been a local and state function, and the control of police accountability has not 
been nation-centered.  Federal, state and local governments’ activities overlap 
to control police accountability.  This article will uncover United States 
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section (hereinafter 
referred to as “Criminal Section”) prosecutorial patterns for law enforcement 
misconduct during the seventeen years between fiscal year 1985 and fiscal year 
2001.  The utility of these prosecutions and Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 
* This paper is a substantially revised version of my presentation at the symposium entitled Law 
Enforcement: New Approaches to Insuring Police Accountability at the St. Louis University 
School of Law on April 5, 2002. I would like to especially thank Roger Goldman for extensive 
discussion of these issues. I also thank Matt Piant, Margaret McDermott, Laura Schulz and Matt 
Waltz for their assistance in preparation of this article. 
** Steven Puro, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, Saint Louis University. 
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(FBI) investigations to attain law enforcement accountability will be analyzed.  
In an article in this journal, Roger Goldman proposes interactions between the 
United States Department of Justice, the FBI, and state and local governmental 
officials that could enhance law enforcement accountability in the United 
States. 
Inter-connectedness among levels of government focuses analysis upon the 
power distribution within particular intergovernmental relationships.  Joel 
Handler argues that federalism is the allocation and reallocation of authority 
between the states and the federal government.1  The federal government has 
authority to control law enforcement misconduct through prosecutions mainly 
by the Criminal Section and the United States Attorneys.  Both the Criminal 
Section and U.S. Attorneys can prosecute law enforcement cases on their own.  
Cooperative efforts between them vary on an annual basis in fiscal years 1985 
to 2001.  In this period, the percentage of cases where U.S. Attorneys 
participated in Criminal Section prosecutions ranged from eight percent to 
sixty-three percent of cases in a year.2 
This article will focus upon processes and patterns of Criminal Section 
prosecutions of law enforcement officials’ criminal conduct that violates 
individuals’ civil rights. The time period from fiscal year 1985 to fiscal year 
2001 is examined for main trends, and there is additional emphasis on the most 
recent five years.  The article examines institutional, structural and legal 
problems faced by federal prosecutors bringing suit against law enforcement 
officials under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.  Interaction between the U.S. 
Department of Justice, its Criminal Section, and other federal and state 
officials during fiscal years 1985 to 2001 will also be discussed. 
II.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, CRIMINAL SECTION 
PROSECUTION OF POLICE MISCONDUCT 
Citizens of a democracy should expect their police not only to enforce the law, 
but to respect it.3 
 
 1. JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION 
AND EMPOWERMENT 63 (1996). 
 2. CRIMINAL SECTION, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF 
CRIMINAL SECTION ACTIVITIES (FY1985 - FY2001) (n.d.) [hereinafter SUMMARY], included in a 
facsimile from Albert N. Moskowitz, Chief, Criminal Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to Roger Goldman, Professor of Law, Saint Louis University (Mar. 4, 2002) (on file 
with author).  See Table 1. 
 3. Christopher E. Stone, Introduction to ALEXIS AGATHOCLEOUS, VERA INSTITUTE OF 
JUSTICE, PROSECUTING POLICE MISCONDUCT: REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF U.S. CIVIL 
RIGHTS 3 (1998). 
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Federal criminal prosecution of law enforcement officials for civil rights 
and constitutional violations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 is a traditional 
remedy for law enforcement misconduct.4  The Criminal Section can receive 
complaints and engage in prosecutorial activities against local, state, and 
federal law enforcement officials who abuse their power and violate the civil 
rights of civilians.5  Prosecutions have been brought against police officers, 
deputy sheriffs, state and federal correctional officers, state constables, and 
federal immigration officials.6 
The U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division has the major 
responsibility in the federal government for the enforcement and prosecution 
of federal civil rights law based upon federal statutes and additional authority 
granted by the Attorney General.7  In addition, the Division, in cooperation 
with the FBI, investigates and prosecutes hate crimes, discrimination in fair 
housing and fair practices in employment, and enforcement of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.8  Some particular sections within the Division have 
specialized activities.  The Criminal Section’s broad responsibility includes 
enforcement of criminal civil rights statutes concerning interference with 
federally protected activities,9 conspiracy to injure citizens in the exercise of 
federal rights,10 interference with fair housing activities,11 and willful 
deprivation of federal rights under color of law.12  The Special Litigation 
Section’s main civil enforcement responsibilities are for the Freedom of 
 
 4. This article will focus upon 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 & 242 (2000).  Federal officers can also be 
prosecuted under the provisions governing search warrants and warrantless searches in18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2234-2236 (2000). 
 5. See generally Oversight Hearing on the Civil Rights Div. Before the Subcomm. on the 
Const. of the House Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Bill Lann Lee, Acting 
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice), 2000 
WL 1115447 (F.D.C.H.) ; CRIMINAL SECTION, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
OVERVIEW, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/overview.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).  Police 
misconduct that has brought prosecution includes police brutality against citizens, use of force to 
extract information and coerced confessions, illegal stops of motorists and pedestrians, and racial 
profiling of select individuals for investigation and detention. 
 6. See generally Oversight Hearing on the Civil Rights Div. Before the Subcomm. on the 
Const. of the House Judiciary Comm., supra note 5; CRIMINAL SECTION, supra note 5. 
 7. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/activity.html (last visited Feb. 2003). 
 8. Id. 
 9. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2000). 
 10. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (2000). 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000).  The Criminal Section also has authority under 18 U.S.C. § 247 
(2000) (damage to religious property), 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000) (Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances) and 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2000) (involuntary servitude).  See generally CRIMINAL 
SECTION, supra note 5. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
98 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:95 
 
Access to Clinic Entrances Act, and for the prevention of patterns or practices 
of departmental police misconduct under 42 U.S.C. § 14141.13  In any given 
fiscal year, the Assistant Attorney General emphasizes certain programs within 
the Division.  For example, in 1998 U.S. House Judiciary Committee 
testimony, Bill Lann Lee said: “I plan to focus on three priorities: fighting hate 
crimes, battling housing and lending discrimination, and attacking 
discrimination against persons with disabilities.”14 
Federal prosecution of criminal civil rights violations is necessary to allow 
the national government to supervise federal, state, and local law enforcement 
officials.  James P. Turner, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Civil 
Rights Division from 1969 to 1993, argues: 
[T]he federal government program has addressed significant violations of 
norms of law enforcement conduct, see, e.g., the Rodney King case where the 
federal government prosecuted law enforcement officers after a failed state 
prosecution, established legal benchmarks for law enforcement conduct and 
encouraged state authorities to meet their primary responsibilities under the 
federal system.15 
The main avenue for the Criminal Section is individual complaints against law 
enforcement officers for using their positions to deprive individuals of 
constitutional rights, such as the right to be free from unwarranted assaults, 
illegal arrests and searches, and the right to be free from deprivation of 
property without due process of law.16  Meritorious complaints advance to the 
 
 13. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL LITIGATION SECTION, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/index.html. 
 14. Oversight of Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 4-5 
[hereinafter Oversight of Civil Rights Division] (statement of Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice). 
 15. See ALEXIS AGATHOCLEOUS, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING POLICE 
MISCONDUCT: REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS 13 (1998). 
 16. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/activity.html (Aug. 2002).  The Criminal Section’s path from complaint 
to trial is described in CRIMINAL SECTION, supra note 5.  It describes the complaint and 
investigation as follows: 
Each complaint received is analyzed to decide whether an investigation is appropriate.  If 
an investigation is recommended, the FBI (the primary investigative agency) conducts the 
investigation by interviewing witnesses and collecting evidence and sends its report both 
to the responsible attorney within the Section, as well as to the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
with responsibilities for federal prosecution within the geographic area where the incident 
occurred.  When the investigation is completed, the prosecutors must then decide whether 
there is sufficient evidence to prove a federal violation and legal authority to pursue the 
case in federal court.). 
Id. 
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level of an FBI investigation. If sufficient evidence is developed, then a grand 
jury indictment and criminal prosecution may be brought. 
In general, in the seventeen years between fiscal year 1985 and fiscal year 
2001, the Criminal Section received 10,000 to 12,000 law enforcement and 
non-law enforcement complaints annually, of which about 3000 advanced to 
FBI investigations.17  As a result of these investigations, annually about 60 
grand jury presentations were authorized, and about 60% of those presentations 
resulted in charges being filed.18  One-half or more of the new grand juries 
convened annually relate to law enforcement matters.19  In the process of 
obtaining these prosecutions, the U.S. Department of Justice coordinates 
activities with local U.S. Attorneys and FBI agents to enforce civil rights law 
and enhance litigation of police misconduct and other criminal cases.  Local 
U.S. Attorneys have knowledge about their community, which can be a source 
of new litigation, and they maintain relationships with local and state police 
agencies.  The Criminal Section has trial experience and knowledge of the 
national dimension of federal prosecutions.20 
The Criminal Section and the FBI coordinate the processing of complaints 
and the conducting of investigations for purposes of bringing prosecutions.  
The FBI does not undertake an investigation of a complaint without 
authorization from the Criminal Section.  When complaints are received by the 
FBI field officers or FBI headquarters, they are forwarded to the Criminal 
Section.  The Criminal Section authorizes a preliminary investigation only 
after it determines that there is a colorable case.  The results of the preliminary 
investigation are reported to FBI headquarters,21 then forwarded to the 
Criminal Section, which decides whether to bring it to a grand jury.  The 
Criminal Section’s main criterion is whether they can prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused officer intentionally violated the defendant’s 
civil rights.  The Criminal Section may instruct that a further investigation be 
 
 17. SUMMARY, supra note 2.  The data contained in the SUMMARY is reproduced in Table 1 
within this article.  With respect to complaints generally, they can occur in a variety of forms: 
citizen correspondence, phone calls, or personal visits to the headquarters of the Department of 
Justice, to the local U.S. Attorney’s Office, or to the FBI and their offices.  CRIMINAL SECTION, 
supra note 5. 
 18. SUMMARY, supra note 2.  Federal grand juries can bring indictments for felonies and 
misdemeanors.  See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000) (requiring that evidence be presented to a grand jury 
in felony cases); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000) (allowing misdemeanor indictments to be brought). 
 19. SUMMARY, supra note 2. 
 20. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL §§ 8-3.100 - 8-3.130 (1998) 
[hereinafter USAM] (illustrating further elements of coordination of activities between the Civil 
Rights Division and United States Attorneys’ Offices). 
 21. See id. at § 8-3.110. 
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conducted.  The U.S. Attorneys may decline cases that arise in their office by 
orally advising the FBI about that decision.22 
This study will analyze the Criminal Section’s activities from fiscal year 
1985 to fiscal year 2001 to determine the scope of those prosecutorial activities 
concerning law enforcement officers.  Data will demonstrate that the Criminal 
Section adopts a careful prosecution program centering upon a limited number 
of grand juries and trials.23  The difficulty of obtaining successful law 
enforcement prosecution and other patterns of Criminal Section activities will 
be examined.  The data will show substantially greater success in the 
percentage of Criminal Section prosecutions in non-law enforcement cases 
than law enforcement cases. This information and analysis can suggest new 
paths for state and federal authorities to address societal issues of law 
enforcement misconduct. 
III.  CRIMINAL SECTION PROSECUTION STRATEGIES CONCERNING POLICE 
MISCONDUCT 
The Criminal Section prosecution strategies involve interactions between 
the federal government and the states. States are key actors in bringing lawsuits 
against law enforcement officials. Turner indicates the established Department 
of Justice policy is to require that efforts be made to encourage state officials 
to take appropriate action under state law and not act as national overseers of 
routine police measures.24  The U.S. Attorney’s Manual shows that federal 
policy dictates that federal prosecutors suspend their federal civil rights 
prosecutions if local charges are filed.25  Also, the government often refrains 
from actively investigating a viable case unless the state declines prosecution, 
and by that time evidence and witnesses may be lost.26 
The Department mainly considers serious violations that have not been 
adequately redressed by state authorities, either because there was no 
prosecution, no conviction, or because the conviction resulted in a plainly 
inadequate sentence.27  This idea is developed further in the Civil Rights 
Division Activities and Programs website which argues: 
Because almost any matter which presents a violation of federal law is also a 
matter involving a local or state law violation, deference is given to local 
 
 22. See id. at § 8-3.150 (concerning declinations of enforcement of civil rights statutes). 
 23. Cf. AGATHOCLEOUS, supra note 15, at 15 (“[T]he Division . . . chooses when and where 
Washington should intervene and prosecute police misconduct.”). 
 24. See James P. Turner, Police Accountability in the Federal System, 30 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 991, 993, 1007 (1999). 
 25. See USAM, supra note 20, at § 9-2.031. 
 26. See Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just Sentencing 
for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 720-21 (1996). 
 27. See Turner, supra note 24, at 993. 
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prosecutions.  But where there is no local action or where the results of the 
state or local proceedings are insufficient to vindicate federal interests, a 
federal prosecution may be brought.28 
In fact, an official U.S. Department of Justice publication says: “[O]ften, local 
authorities will  take the lead in prosecuting violent conduct under state 
statutes, even though such conduct also constitutes a violation of federal civil 
rights law. In such cases, the Department of Justice presumes state prosecutors 
to vindicate federal interests.”29  Christopher Stone, Director of Vera Institute, 
reinforces this analysis by stating:  “The Civil Rights Division is not the most 
direct mechanism of police oversight in the nation, nor is it the primary 
mechanism on which the people of any single jurisdiction rely. . . .”30 
 Recognition must be given to the fact that the federal government lacks 
adequate resources because they have a small number of prosecutors in the 
Criminal Section. In 1996, this Section had approximately thirty attorneys 
whose caseloads were divided among all federal civil rights crimes.31  More 
specific information showed that in 1998, there were only thirty-two full-time 
attorneys who worked on police misconduct cases in the Criminal Section.32 
Standards for FBI investigations also give priority to state and local 
prosecutions when state or local criminal charges are filed against the 
subject(s) of an investigation.  In these instances, the FBI’s policy calls for the 
investigation to be suspended.33  In investigations of law enforcement officers’ 
criminal violations of individuals’ civil rights, FBI officers face conflicting 
demands between U.S. Department of Justice policies and the FBI’s close 
working relationships with local and state police officers and prosecutors. For 
example, when state and local prosecutors subpoena FBI agents to testify, the 
FBI will resist compliance with the subpoena from their investigations in state, 
local, or federal proceedings where the United States is not a party unless the 
FBI agent personally observed the behavior.34  Instructions in the United States 
Attorneys’ Manual concerning enforcement of civil rights statutes state: “In 
such cases, where state and local authorities undertake vigorous prosecution in 
 
 28. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 16. 
 29. See CRIMINAL SECTION, supra note 5. 
 30. See Stone, supra note 3, at 3. 
 31. Freeman, supra note 26, at 721. 
 32. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 95 (1998). 
 33. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS RESOURCE MANUAL sec. 47 (Oct. 1997).  
Subsection B provides conditions for exceptions to this procedure.  Id. 
 34. USAM, supra note 20, at § 8-3.180; see also 28 C.F.R § 16.22 (West, WESTLAW 
through Oct. 1, 2002). 
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state courts, it is Department policy to cooperate fully with the local 
prosecutor.”35 
Relationships between local U.S. Attorneys and the U.S. Department of 
Justice have limited federal prosecutorial activity. Prior to the late 1990s, 
before U.S. Attorneys began an investigation or prosecution, they had to 
submit cases concerning law enforcement officers’ criminal violations of 
individuals’ civil rights to Department of Justice headquarters. Moreover, prior 
to 1990 the norm was for the Civil Rights Division to prosecute cases through 
the national office. This practice often restricted the number of cases based 
upon national office capabilities, and often delayed prosecution of other 
cases.36  By the mid-1990s this practice changed. In 1998, Bill Lann Lee, then 
Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, stated that the norm at that 
time was for the Civil Rights Division to prosecute police misconduct cases 
jointly with local U.S. Attorneys’ offices.37 
The numbers in Table 2 (below) are indicative of that change in behavior, 
showing a significant increase in the number of law enforcement defendants 
from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal years 1997 and 1998.  There was a doubling of 
these defendants between fiscal year 1996 (33 defendants) and fiscal year 1997 
(67 defendants); and that level was maintained in fiscal year 1998 (74 
defendants). 
Successful federal criminal prosecution against individual officers is 
difficult to accomplish.  Major difficulties for prosecutorial success are: 
standards of proof, juries’ willingness to believe the police and the justification 
for their activities, and, as noted earlier, Department of Justice relationships 
with the FBI and state and local police departments.  From 1957 to 1994, the 
Criminal Section’s dominant and almost exclusive avenue against police 
brutality and violations of citizens was a criminal prosecution against 
individual officers under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.  A civil component for 
legal action was added through the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act, especially with its pattern-or-practice section, to take action 
against entire police departments.38 Since 1995, criminal prosecution under §§ 
241 and 242 remains a significant element of the Division’s activities. 
 
 35. USAM, supra note 20, at §§ 8-3.170 & 8-3.180; see also C.F.R §§ 16.22 & 16.26(c) 
(West, WESTLAW 2002).  The FBI will not provide information from their investigations in 
state and local proceedings or federal proceedings where the United States is not a party, unless 
the FBI agent personally observed the behavior.  USAM, supra note 20, at §§ 8-3.170 & 8-3.180. 
 36. Oversight of Civil Rights Division, supra note 14. 
 37. AGATHOCLEOUS, supra note 15, at 15. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (West, WESTLAW 2002). 
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John Jacobi indicates difficulties for federal prosecution of police 
misconduct cases.39  In order to bring a case under § 242, the prosecutor must 
provide evidence to prove the officer’s specific intent.  The “specific intent” 
has often translated into proving that the officer had the specific purpose of 
depriving an individual of a constitutional right. He quotes Paul Chevigny: 
To get a conviction, the [federal] prosecution must prove “specific intent” on 
the part of the local official to violate a federal right, as distinct, for example, 
from intent simply to assault the victim. . . .  The usual difficulties in 
prosecuting police in any system, combined with the high standard of intent 
and the deference to local prosecutors, mean that federal criminal law 
contributes little to the accountability of local police for acts of violence.40 
Heads of the Criminal Section and veteran Criminal Section attorneys 
regularly explain the low rate of prosecution by indicating that law 
enforcement misconduct cases are difficult to bring to trial, and convincing 
jurors to convict is difficult.41 
Prosecutors at all government levels often lack the willingness and 
resources to screen complaints of law enforcement misconduct.  In a report by 
Human Rights Watch, it is suggested that when asked to prosecute an officer, 
prosecutors face an impossible conflict of interest between their desire to 
maintain working relationships and their duty to investigate and prosecute 
police brutality.42  The number of complaints against police officers in a large 
urban area makes its difficult to prosecute in any but the most egregious 
cases.43  Other reasons contributing to the low number of law enforcement 
prosecutions include the fact that prosecutors must rely on officers who may 
have divided loyalties.44  Fellow officers are reluctant to vigorously pursue 
investigations of other officers’ misconduct; many officers follow a code of 
silence that frustrates the investigation.  Often police refuse to cooperate or 
testify against fellow officers.  Many times there are no witnesses other than 
the victim, and then it becomes a credibility issue between a police officer and 
the victim.  Victims usually have a criminal record or were committing a crime 
when the civil rights violation occurred.  Also, many times the victims were 
 
 39. John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Conduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 809 (2000); see 
also Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in 
Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1503 (1993). 
 40. Jacobi, supra note 39, at 810 (quoting PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE 
VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 107-08 (1995)). 
 41. AGATHOCLEOUS, supra note 15 passim. 
 42. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 32, at 86. 
 43. Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The 
Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509, 537 (1994). 
 44. Id. at 536-37. 
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drunk or using drugs at the time or have a history of such use.  Meanwhile, 
police officers have inherent credibility by virtue of their position.45 
Patterns of difficulties of federal prosecution of law enforcement officers 
are found in Criminal Section activities from fiscal years 1984 to 1995. In 
these data, reported directly by the Criminal Section for the time period 
overlapping this study’s analysis, the Criminal Section reports a higher success 
rate for its general civil rights docket46—for example, cases involving matters 
such as racial violence and housing interference—than its rate of success in 
law enforcement misconduct cases which include police brutality.47  Studies 
have repeatedly shown that it is more difficult to convict a police officer than 
any other defendant.48  Overall, in these eleven years the Criminal Section had 
a 71% success rate in prosecuting law enforcement officers charged with civil 
rights violations.49  By contrast there was a greater than 95% success rate for 
prosecuting non-law enforcement individuals charged with civil rights 
violations.50  The latter high success rate results from the small number of 
acquittals in the non-law enforcement category. 
In fiscal year 2001, the Criminal Section was successful in 100% of its 
non-law enforcement prosecutions and had an 80% success rate concerning 
law enforcement officials, and the combined overall success rate was 89%.  
Within the Criminal Section the success rate is based upon pleas plus 
convictions divided by the total number of pleas, convictions, and acquittals.  
A plea bargain is defined as a successful outcome; and the number of the 
Criminal Section’s plea bargains and its success rates are given in Table 1, 
below.  In contrast, there is the Section’s conviction rate, calculated as the 
number of convictions divided by the number of convictions and acquittals.  In  
 
 45. Freeman, supra note 26, at 724-25 (citing Police Brutality: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 
120 (1991) (testimony of James Fyfe)). 
 46. Id. at 726 (citing an earlier edition of SUMMARY, supra note 2). 
 47. Id. at 723 (citing an earlier edition of SUMMARY, supra note 2).  Success is defined as an 
outcome of guilty, whether by conviction or plea.  The success rate, expressed as a percentage, is 
the ratio of convictions and pleas over the total number of cases filed.  For five years the Criminal 
Section’s success rate for all cases was higher than its rate of success specifically in law-
enforcement cases: 94.4% overall versus 77.8% in law enforcement cases in 1990, 89.3% versus 
80.6% (1991), 85% versus 62.2% (1992), 73.6% versus 58.7% (1993) and 92.2% versus 78.7% 
(1994).  See Table 1. 
 48. Levenson, supra note 43, at 541 (citing CIVIL  RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  
INTERNAL REPORT (1993), as showing that the conviction rate for civil rights prosecutions against 
police officers is consistently less than any other type of civil rights prosecution). 
 49. Id. at 541 (citing an earlier edition of SUMMARY, supra note 2, as showing that in the ten 
years from 1982-1992 the conviction rate from trials, as opposed to guilty pleas, is much less, at 
approximately 30%). 
 50. Id.; see also Paul Lieberman, King Case Prosecutors Must Scale Hurdles of History, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1998, at A1. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003 FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICY ACCOUNTABILITY 105 
 
that same year, 2001, the Section’s conviction rate for law enforcement 
officials was 52%.51 
IV.  POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: CRIMINAL SECTION ACTIVITIES DURING 
FISCAL YEARS 1985-2001 
The current study uncovers patterns of the Criminal Section’s prosecutorial 
activities between fiscal years 1985 and 2001.52  Trends in its attempt to 
achieve accountability among law enforcement officers will be analyzed. 
There was substantial difficulty in obtaining specific elements of the Criminal 
Section data.  While much of the information contains the number of law 
enforcement officials and non-law enforcement individuals, neither the number 
of complaints filed nor the number of FBI investigations is separated for law 
enforcement officials and non-law enforcement individuals in any fiscal year.  
For example, between fiscal years 1997 and 2001, the Criminal Section 
received 60,057 complaints and requested and reviewed about 15,863 FBI 
investigations.  Data in Table 1 does not provide information about the 
allocation of these complaints and investigations between law enforcement 
officials and non-law enforcement individuals.  Missing or incomplete data 
were found in other areas.  For example, U.S. Congressional testimony 
permitted only estimates of the number of police brutality/police misconduct 
investigations.  This article’s analysis of a seventeen-year time period of the 
Criminal Section activities clarifies its behavior concerning law enforcement 
officials.  The analysis will proceed by first examining Criminal Section 
activities in fiscal year 2001 to help readers interpret the data, then providing 
an overview of the seventeen-year time period and a focus upon the most 
recent five-year time period. 
 
 51. SUMMARY, supra note 2. 
 52. The analysis presented herein is based on data compiled by the Criminal Section, itself, 
summarizing its investigative and prosecutorial activities.  SUMMARY, supra note 2.  The data is 
reproduced in this article in Table 1.  All of the data discussed in this section of the article (§ IV) 
for which a source is not otherwise provided comes from the SUMMARY either directly or 
derivatively. 
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TABLE 153 
SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL SECTION ACTIVITIES, FISCAL YEARS 
1985-2001 
 
Fiscal Year 1985 1986 1987 
  Total LE Total LE Total LE 
        
Complaints 9044  7546  7348  
FBI 
Investigations 2970  2792  2826  
New Grand 
Juries 56 40 49 34 57 37 
Indictments 35  35  40  
Informations 10  14  18  
Cases Filed 45 30 49 35 58 40 
U.S. Att’y 
Participation 
(% of cases 
filed) 38  63  20  
Defendants 106 67 112 70 105 74 
Trials 30 20 34 24 24 20 
Convictions 41 29 55 30 17 10 
Pleas 36 19 41 16 36 24 
Acquittals 21 15 20 17 17 13 
Success Rate 
(%) 77.8 75 82 72 75.7 72.3 
 
 
 53. The data in this table has been reproduced from SUMMARY, supra note 2. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Fiscal Year 1988 1989 1990 
  Total LE Total LE Total LE 
        
Complaints 7603  8053  7960  
FBI 
Investigations 2898  3177  3050  
New Grand 
Juries 44 29 40 25 47 25 
Indictments 35  26  30  
Informations 8  34  36  
Cases Filed 43 29 60 18 66 23 
U.S. Att’y 
Participation 
(% of cases 
filed) 31  8  14  
Defendants 71 49 85 22 101 37 
Trials 30 20 23 21 14 8 
Convictions 21 11 23 20 17 5 
Pleas 50 34 68 13 51 9 
Acquittals 26 22 10 10 3 3 
Success Rate 
(%) 70.3 64.3 87.5 73 94.4 77.8 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Fiscal Year 1991 1992 1993 
  Total LE Total LE Total LE 
        
Complaints 9835  8599  9620  
FBI 
Investigations 3583  3212  3026  
New Grand 
Juries 63 41 74 46 51 30 
Indictments 44 26 38 21 34 18 
Informations 25 10 26 6 25 10 
Cases Filed 69 36 64 27 59 28 
U.S. Att’y 
Participation 
(% of cases 
filed) 31  38  27  
Defendants 137 67 112 59 97 50 
Trials 26 16 18 12 30 18 
Convictions 36 26 16 6 36 16 
Pleas 73 24 80 22 45 21 
Acquittals 13 12 17 17 29 26 
Success Rate 
(%) 89.3 80.6 85 62.2 73.6 58.7 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Fiscal Year 1994 1995 1996 
  Total LE Total LE Total LE 
        
Complaints 8342  8864  11721  
FBI 
Investigations 2633  2370  2619  
New Grand 
Juries 64 34 68 38 70 37 
Indictments 40 18 46 17 50 18 
Informations 36 16 37 10 29 4 
Cases Filed 76 34 83 27 79 22 
U.S. Att’y 
Participation 
(% of cases 
filed) 29  30  23  
Defendants 139 46 138 50 128 33 
Trials 23 15 24 7 22 12 
Convictions 22 12 32 6 22 10 
Pleas 81 25 75 23 85 19 
Acquittals 11 10 13 8 14 14 
Success Rate 
(%) 90.4 78.7 89.2 78.4 86.9 64.4 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Fiscal Year 1997 1998 1999 
  Total LE Total LE Total LE 
        
Complaints 10891  12192  12132  
FBI 
Investigations 3321  3802  3664  
New Grand 
Juries 68 31 78 37 72 36 
Indictments 54 20 58 31 58 30 
Informations 23 5 21 8 31 6 
Cases Filed 77 25 79 39 89 36 
U.S. Att’y 
Participation 
(% of cases 
filed) 29  29  38  
Defendants 189 67 153 74 138 58 
Trials 19 10 27 14 33 18 
Convictions 36 9 38 14 26 11 
Pleas 81 19 128 34 72 20 
Acquittals 6 4 8 5 23 20 
Success Rate 
(%) 95.1 87.5 94.8 88.6 80.9 60.8 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Fiscal Year 2000 2001 
  Total LE Total LE 
      
Complaints 12404  12438  
FBI 
Investigations 2835  2241  
New Grand 
Juries 76 48 65 40 
Indictments 55 28 52 32 
Informations 29 12 42 17 
Cases Filed 84 40 93 49 
U.S. Att’y 
Participation 
(% of cases 
filed) 19  29  
Defendants 122 66 191 97 
Trials 37 28 21 16 
Convictions 34 25 18 14 
Pleas 78 29 101 42 
Acquittals 16 16 13 13 
Success Rate 
(%) 87.4 77.1 89.4 80 
 
An initial understanding of the data can be accomplished by examining 
activities in fiscal year 2001, the most recent data available.  The Criminal 
Section’s Summary gives the total number of complaints for all cases within its 
jurisdiction (12,348 in fiscal year 2001, the highest number of complaints in 
any fiscal year during this period) and FBI investigations (2241 in fiscal year 
2001), but both of those totals include claims against non-law enforcement 
officials.54  These data do not provide a complete picture of the extent of law 
enforcement officers’ civil rights violations because law enforcement 
complaints and investigations are not separated out from the others until the 
category “Number of New Grand Juries” (40 law enforcement officers in fiscal 
 
 54. Were the information available regarding the number of complaints against and 
investigations of law enforcement officers and the number of cases deferred to the states, a 
determination would be permitted of the percentage of pleas, convictions and acquittals of law 
enforcement officers compared to the number of complaints against and FBI investigations of law 
enforcement officers.  That comparison is impossible to make given the lack of data. 
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year 2001).  For this category and the remaining categories the number of law 
enforcement and non-law enforcement cases can be studied and comparisons 
can be drawn between these types of cases.  Also listed are the total number of 
cases filed against law enforcement officers (49 in fiscal year 2001), the 
number of law enforcement officers prosecuted (97 in fiscal year 2001), the 
number of law enforcement officers pleading guilty (42 in fiscal year 2001), 
the number of convictions of law enforcement officers (14 in fiscal year 2001), 
and the number of acquittals (13 in fiscal year 2001). The number of officers 
who pled guilty or were convicted (56 in fiscal year 2001) was the highest total 
in the past seventeen years.  Of the cases going to trial, the conviction rate of 
law enforcement officers was 52% in fiscal year 2001, compared to the 100% 
conviction rate for all other categories of civil rights violations in that year.  
The conviction rate and success rate are calculated differently, the former 
involving only convictions and acquittals, and the latter including pleas as a 
successful outcome.55  An overview of the seventeen-year period will develop 
broad trends and will be followed by an examination of the Section’s activities 
in the most recent five fiscal years (1997 to 2001). 
The number of law enforcement defendants prosecuted by the Criminal 
Section presents an irregular pattern between fiscal year 1985 and fiscal year 
2001. Fifty-eight law enforcement defendants was the mean number of law 
enforcement defendants per fiscal year, but there was significant variation 
around this mean. The lowest number of law enforcement defendants was 22 in 
fiscal year 1989, and the highest number was 97 defendants in fiscal year 2001. 
During these seventeen fiscal years, the Criminal Section increased their 
jurisdiction in two major areas.  New prosecutions could be brought under the 
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 199456 and 18 U.S.C. § 247,57 
which was substantially amended in 1996. Between fiscal years 1996 and 
1997, when the amendments to the latter statute would have been applied, 
there was a major shift in the number of law enforcement defendants 
prosecuted by the Criminal Section—from 33 to 67 defendants.  The 1997 
level was retained through fiscal year 2000; at that point there was a one-third 
increase in fiscal year 2001 when, as noted above, the number of defendants 
reached 97, its highest number. The number of complaints varied considerably 
 
 55. I calculated the conviction rate as the number of convictions divided by the number of 
convictions and acquittals. The Justice Department also uses the category of success rate, which 
is the number of convictions and pleas divided by the number of convictions and pleas and 
acquittals.  As will be discussed below, pleas are one important part of the pattern of criminal 
section outcomes. 
 56. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994; 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000). 
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 247 (2000) (protecting against damage to religious property and free 
exercise of religious beliefs, amended in 1996 to include prohibition of acts motivated by race, 
ethnicity, or color). 
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between fiscal year 1985 and fiscal year 1995, with a range from 7348 (fiscal 
year 1987) to 9835 (fiscal year 1991). In this eleven-year period the average 
number of complaints was 8437. The number of complaints had a substantial 
change between fiscal years 1996 and 2001. The highest number of complaints 
occurred between fiscal years 1998 and 2001, with an average of 12,291 
complaints per year. 
Table 1 reinforces the argument that the Criminal Section had greater 
difficulty in obtaining a successful outcome, conviction or plea, in federal 
prosecution of law enforcement officials than non-law enforcement 
individuals.  In each of the seventeen fiscal years, it had a higher success rate 
for non-law enforcement individuals. Trials under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 
often have more than a single defendant, and this information is reflected in 
Table 1.58 Once the Criminal Section brought a law enforcement case to trial, 
there was substantial difficulty in obtaining a conviction. Between fiscal years 
1985 and 2001, there were 254 convictions and 225 acquittals, an average of 
15 convictions and 13 acquittals per year. Yearly, the number of law 
enforcement convictions and all the acquittals had a wide variation.  In seven 
fiscal years, there were more acquittals than convictions in law enforcement 
cases.59  In three other fiscal years, there were only one or two more 
convictions than acquittals.60  In the seventeen fiscal years discussed herein, 
law enforcement officials accounted for the vast majority of acquittals and in 
some years all acquittals. The Criminal Section was consistently more 
successful in non-law enforcement cases in obtaining convictions rather than 
acquittals; in these cases there were 236 convictions and 35 acquittals.  At trial, 
the acquittal of a law enforcement official was a realistic possibility in contrast 
to acquittals in non-law enforcement cases. 
At the trial level, plea bargains represent the most frequent outcome in 
both law enforcement and non-law enforcement cases. In many years the total 
number of pleas in both categories is greater than the combined total of 
convictions and acquittals; focus especially on fiscal years 1987 through 1992.  
More pleas are found in non-law enforcement cases due to the larger number 
of these cases than law enforcement cases. In the law enforcement category, 
between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, this pattern of a greater number of pleas 
occurred in four of the seven years; the main exception is law enforcement 
officials in fiscal year 2000 when there were 25 convictions and 29 pleas, or 
53% pleas.  The highest ratio between pleas and convictions for non-law 
 
 58. For any given year, compare the total number of defendants with the total number of 
cases. 
 59. See Table 1.  There were more acquittals than convictions in fiscal years 1987, 1988, 
1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1999. 
 60. See Table 1.  There were only one or two more convictions than acquittals in fiscal years 
1990, 1994, and 2001. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
114 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:95 
 
enforcement officials was in fiscal year 2001, when there were 18 convictions 
and 101 pleas, or 85% pleas.  Recently, in fiscal years 2000 and 2001, there 
have been a substantially greater percentage of pleas for non-law enforcement 
cases than law enforcement cases. 
Focus upon the most recent five-year time period (fiscal years 1997 to 
2001) gives appropriate parameters to the scope of the Criminal Section’s path 
to investigation and indictment of law enforcement officers. The 1997 to 2001 
period demonstrates greater government activity than the previous five-year 
time period in almost every dimension.  During the same period, the Criminal 
Section received 60,057 complaints and requested and reviewed 15,863 FBI 
investigations.  Matters about law enforcement officers were presented to 192 
grand juries based upon prosecutors bringing 141 indictments and 48 criminal 
informations.  There were steady patterns of indictments during the last four 
fiscal years with an average of 30 indictments per year. Criminal Section 
attorneys brought 29 criminal informations during fiscal years 2000 and 2001, 
and this number represents a marked increase from the total of 19 criminal 
informations for the three previous years, fiscal years 1997 to 1999. In the past 
five fiscal years, the Criminal Section filed 189 cases against law enforcement 
officers. The outcome of Criminal Section prosecutions of law enforcement 
officials in the last five fiscal years was 144 guilty pleas, 86 trials in which 73 
defendants were convicted, and 58 acquittals.61  When considered over a five-
year period, there are a limited number of cases moving from investigations, 
grand jury indictments, or prosecutorial informations to trials. 
The five-year period from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2001 shows a 
rapid filtering from civil rights complaints received, to FBI investigations 
conducted, to new federal grand juries convened.  In Table 1A, two patterns 
are shown: relationships between complaints received by the Criminal Section 
and FBI investigations, and relationships between FBI investigations and new 
grand juries concerning law enforcement officials.  In these five fiscal years, 
the FBI investigated an average of 26.4% of complaints filed with the Criminal 
Section. Only 2.3% of the FBI investigations develop into grand juries, and 
approximately one-half of the grand juries, or an average of 1.2% of FBI 
investigations, concern law enforcement officials.62  Scholars should search for 
and obtain additional information to clarify U.S. Department of Justice 
prosecutorial activities about law enforcement officials. 
 
 61. In each jury trial, there can be one or more defendants.  The Department of Justice did 
not provide information on the range of the number of defendants in each trial. 
 62. Determination of Department of Justice and FBI criteria for which complaints merit an 
FBI investigation requires analysis of their internal rules and memoranda. 
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TABLE 1A63 
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Once an FBI investigation is completed, the Criminal Section chooses 
which cases to pursue and which to decline.  Negotiations among attorneys 
within the Criminal Section and between Criminal Section attorneys and the 
FBI also affect these choices. Human Rights Watch obtained information on 
the Criminal Section’s reasons for declining cases in fiscal year 1995, which 
appears to be a representative year of the Criminal Section’s activities.  Of the 
2,830 declined cases, 497, or approximately 18%, were categorized as having a 
“lack of evidence of criminal intent,” 482, or approximately 17%, as having 
“no federal offense evident,” and 778, or approximately 27%, as having “weak 
or insufficient admissible evidence.”64  The U.S. Department of Justice does 
not provide data on or patterns concerning cases that are deferred to states for 
prosecution.  Jacobi proposes a new criminal law that supplements current 
federal authority and would permit more active involvement by the 
 
 63. The data in this table is derived from SUMMARY, supra note 2. 
 64. Jacobi, supra note 39, at 810-11 (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 32, at 389-
91). 
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Department of Justice in combating police brutality.65  The main focus of the 
new authority is serious police misconduct cases that go without state and local 
prosecution because these officials failed to pursue the case, or pursued it half-
heartedly, and the Criminal Section determined they could not prosecute 
because the specific intent requirement was not present.66 
Information about the number of FBI investigations concerning police 
brutality and police misconduct has been difficult to obtain. Estimates for two 
parts of the time period under investigation were found. First, in a 1991 U.S. 
House Judiciary Hearing, William Baker, Assistant Director, Criminal 
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, said:  “In carrying out this 
jurisdiction, the FBI places its highest priority on cases concerning police 
brutality, which comprise 50 percent of the civil rights inquiries we initiate.”67  
In the period immediately preceding this testimony, fiscal years 1985-91, the 
approximate number of police brutality/police misconduct investigations 
ranged from 1,490 (fiscal year 1985) to 1,790 (fiscal year 1991).68  There were 
a declining number of investigations from fiscal year 1985 through fiscal year 
1988, with a larger number of investigations from fiscal year 1989 to fiscal 
year 1991.  The average number of law enforcement convictions and pleas in 
these seven fiscal years was 19 convictions and 20 pleas. 
Second, the FBI’s Civil Rights Program website indicates a recently 
increased emphasis on police misconduct issues between fiscal year 1997 and 
fiscal year 2000:  “The average number of all federal civil rights cases initiated 
by the FBI from 1997-2000 was 3,513.  Of those cases initiated, about 73% 
were allegations of color of law violations, and about 82% of those allegations 
concerned abuse of force with violence.”69  Since some of these cases are 
 
 65. Jacobi, supra note 39, at 811.  The proposal is a new statute 18 U.S.C. § 242A which 
would permit federal prosecution of law enforcement officers who commit serious misconduct 
under color of state law, but only when local officials fail to act.  The proposed statute only 
requires officers to engage in intentional or reckless harm to individuals’ civil rights rather than 
the higher standard of specific intent to deprive a victim of his civil rights. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Police Brutality: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 7 (1991) (statement of William Baker, Assistant 
Director, Criminal Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).  For another analysis of police 
brutality, see JAMES H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE 
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE (1993). 
 68. Based on the substance of the testimony of Mr. Baker quoted above, see supra note 67 
and accompanying text, these numbers are calculated as 50% of the total number of investigations 
in the identified year, as shown in Table 1. 
 69. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, COLOR OF LAW, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/ 
civilrights/color.htm. 
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counted more than once, the police misconduct issues constitute 60%70 of the 
total number of civil rights cases initiated in the period between fiscal year 
1997 to fiscal year 2000.  The estimated number of FBI police 
brutality/misconduct investigations for the four fiscal years 1997 to 2000 
averages 2,564 investigations per year.  In the same period, the average 
number of cases filed against law enforcement personnel was 35 and the 
average number of such defendants was 66.  There was an average of 17.5 
trials per year, with a high-water mark of 28 trials in fiscal year 2000.  The 
average number of convictions and pleas in these fiscal years was 14.75 and 
25.5, respectively.  The recent data reflects a lower average number of 
convictions and a slightly higher number of pleas than in fiscal years 1985 to 
1991. This data, again, reflects the small number of law enforcement 
convictions and pleas when contrasted with the number of FBI investigations, 
even while there is increased U.S. Department of Justice and FBI emphasis on 
police misconduct. 
Further exploration of the recent time period from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal 
year 2001 indicates that the Criminal Section has increased its focus upon law 
enforcement defendants when compared to all defendants. From fiscal years 
1998-2001, there was a marked increase in the percentage of cases going to 
trial concerning law enforcement defendants when compared to the previous 
three fiscal years. There was a particular increase in fiscal years 2000 and 
2001, and the last four fiscal years were at or above the mean percentage of 
law enforcement defendants for the last seven fiscal years. In 2000 and 2001, 
the Criminal Section increased the number of grand juries for law enforcement 
officials to 88 grand juries, which represents a 20% increase from the 73 grand 
juries in fiscal years 1998 and 1999. 
 
TABLE 271 
LAW ENFORCEMENT DEFENDANTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, 





Total Number of 
Defendants 
(a) 






(b)/ (a) * 100 
1995 138 50 36.2 
1996 128 33 25.8 
1997 189 67 35.4 
 
 70. Eighty-two percent of seventy-three percent of the total number of investigations is equal 
to sixty percent of that total. 
 71. The data in this table is derived from SUMMARY, supra note 2. 
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1998 153 74 48.3 
1999 138 58 42.0 
2000 122 66 54.1 
2001 191 97 50.7 
TOTALS 1059 445 42.0 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section is 
seriously concerned about problems of civil rights in American society, and 
individual and law enforcement officials’ violation of individual’s civil rights.  
The Section acts to deter abuse of law enforcement authority through a limited 
number of carefully selected cases that establish parameters of acceptable 
police conduct among federal and state law enforcement officials.  The 
Criminal Section and the FBI engage in a complex federalism relationship 
when interacting with state and local officials concerning criminal prosecution 
of police misconduct.  The Criminal Section’s prosecution strategy is 
deferential to state and local prosecutions of law enforcement misconduct. 
The data analysis in this study examined Criminal Section prosecutions of 
violation of individuals’ civil rights from fiscal year 1985 to fiscal year 2001. 
In each year of the seventeen-year period, only a small percentage of 
complaints presented to the Department and FBI investigations resulted in 
grand jury presentments and trials. The analysis provided substantial evidence 
that once the Criminal Section decided to prosecute a law enforcement officer, 
the Criminal Section had substantial difficulty in obtaining a conviction.  The 
Criminal Section also had greater difficulty obtaining a successful 
prosecutorial outcome, conviction or plea, for law enforcement officials than 
non-law enforcement individuals. 
The study demonstrated the importance of guilty pleas in resolving cases.  
Pleas were the dominant outcome in cases that the Criminal Section 
prosecuted.  When law enforcement officials are convicted for federal civil 
rights charges, federal prosecutors could develop strategies that enhance the 
ability of state revocation officials, such as Peace Officer Standards and 
Training Boards, to take action against state law enforcement officials. In 
matters concerning law enforcement officials’ violation of an individual’s civil 
rights which are not brought to trial, federal prosecutors could share 
information with these state revocation officials.  This information about police 
misconduct can allow state revocation officials to follow due process 
procedures which leads to removal or other penalties against a law 
enforcement officer’s license.  These interactions between federal and state 
officials could enhance police accountability. 
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Professor Roger Goldman’s article in this issue offers possibilities of 
cooperation between federal officials and state officials, including Peace 
Officer Standards and Training Boards, to achieve police accountability.  
States play a significant role in redressing police misconduct.  In law 
enforcement accountability, states are not dependent upon the federal 
government for fiscal or administrative assistance.72  In the last twenty years, 
forty-four (44) states have created legislation or administrative rules that allow 
decertification/revocation of law enforcement licenses for officer misconduct 
and provide positive signals to the public about police integrity and 
competence.73 States vary in the scope of law enforcement activities that are 
subject to decertification/revocation, and there are varying degrees of 
administrative capabilities and authority to implement 
decertification/revocation legislation. In almost all states with law enforcement 
revocation authority, conviction of a felony will lead to permanent loss of 
license; in addition, some states allow revocation for misdemeanor convictions.  
In a recent article, Professor Goldman and I have discussed several states with 
active police decertification programs.74 
Can federal prosecutorial activities, successful or not, assist state practices 
for law enforcement decertification programs?75  Possible cooperative linkages 
between the federal Criminal Section and state decertification activities can 
include new federal legislative and regulatory authority to the Criminal Section 
officials to share investigative information about law enforcement misconduct 
with state POST officials.  Such new authority could ferret out law 
enforcement misconduct and ensure such officers’ accountability and 
overcome current barriers to cooperation between federal and state authorities.  
Professor Goldman’s article pursues arguments concerning federal 
prosecutors’ use of plea bargains to require state peace officers to temporarily 
or permanently relinquish their law enforcement license as part of the 
agreement.76 
 
 72. SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT 7 
(2001). 
 73. Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Officer Certification: A Viable 
Remedy for Police Misconduct, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 541 (2000). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Roger L. Goldman, State Revocation of Law Enforcement Officers’ Licenses and 
Federal Criminal Prosecution: An Opportunity for Cooperative Federalism, 22 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUB. L. REV. 121 (2003). 
 76. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
120 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:95 
 
 
